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A Culture Without Consequences? 
Redefining Purposeful Availment for 
Wrongful Online Conduct 
Jenny L. Grantz* 
The Internet often seems like a place without consequences, where we can share our 
thoughts without much consideration of whether the things we share might cause harm. 
And even when Internet users knowingly cause harm to others, many escape civil suit 
because they are not subject to personal jurisdiction in the plaintiff’s chosen forum. 
Often this is a result of courts’ fear of creating nationwide jurisdiction in cases 
involving the Internet, and often the reason given for denying specific jurisdiction is 
that it was not reasonably foreseeable to the defendant that they might be haled into 
court in the plaintiff’s chosen forum. But attempts to limit jurisdiction over wrongful 
online conduct to those forums in which suit was “reasonably foreseeable” have 
actually made it more difficult for defendants to know when and where they might be 
held liable, as cases with the same facts can come to opposite results depending on the 
test applied. This Note explores the current state of personal jurisdiction for intentional, 
wrongful acts conducted over the Internet, ultimately concluding that courts must 
create a better test for whether specific jurisdiction exists in these cases. Only when 
courts focus on the defendant’s knowledge and intent with regard to the plaintiff can 
they create fair outcomes in individual cases and ensure that Internet users understand 
when and where they will be subject to suit. 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2012. I would like to 
thank Professors David Levine and James Wagstaffe for their advice on this Note, Sara Tosdal for her 
mentorship, Frances Valdez for her patience and enthusiasm, and the entire staff of the Hastings Law 
Journal for their dedication and endless hard work. I am especially grateful to my family for their 
constant support and faith, without which I would not be where I am today. 
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The Internet often seems like a place without consequences. Gossip 
blogs and discussion forums purportedly shroud us in anonymity and 
then invite us to share our every thought—or, at least, our funniest and 
most biting comments—about other people. Google Image Search makes 
it easy to find and download photos, logos, and artistic works regardless 
of whether they are protected by trademark or copyright. And it is not 
just unintentionally harmful conduct that gets a pass: Even those who use 
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the Internet to knowingly harm others1 often escape punishment. Many 
would-be defendants simply laugh off threats of defamation or 
infringement lawsuits, assuming they will come to nothing.2 Often, this 
assumption is correct. While some questionable conduct is protected by 
parody, fair use, and other such defenses, many civil suits for wrongful 
online conduct3 never reach consideration on the merits, as culpable 
actors escape suit because of difficulties in establishing jurisdiction over 
them. 
Courts frequently conclude that they do not have specific personal 
jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants whose only contact with the 
forum state is the wrongful act they directed at the plaintiff via the 
Internet.4 This state of affairs is the result of courts’ fear that the 
ubiquitous nature of the Internet will create nationwide jurisdiction over 
all defendants in suits arising from online conduct. In assessing specific 
jurisdiction in these cases, courts often focus on aspects of the 
defendant’s online activity that do not relate to her knowledge or intent 
with respect to the plaintiff.5 As a result, plaintiffs are unable to pursue 
their claims on a theory of specific jurisdiction and instead must bring 
their suit in a forum in which the court can establish general jurisdiction 
over the defendant.6 This is true even if similar conduct would have 
created specific jurisdiction over a defendant in a context other than the 
Internet. 
The struggle to define the scope of specific jurisdiction arising from 
wrongful online conduct requires courts to balance competing ideas of 
fairness: Is it fairer for a defendant to be haled into a forum in which they 
might not have realized they had contacts, or is it fairer to prevent the 
plaintiff from bringing suit anywhere except where general jurisdiction 
can be established? In cases involving two private individuals, general 
jurisdiction may be limited to the defendant’s home state, which could be 
across the country from the plaintiff. As far as many plaintiffs are 
concerned, then, fairness means that courts should have jurisdiction in 
 
 1. See Mattathias Schwartz, Malwebolence, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 2008, at A24 (discussing the 
popular practice of “trolling,” or purposefully provoking others online for the sake of humor). 
 2. See, e.g., Rich Kyanka, Jones Soda vs. Something Awful, Something Awful (Oct. 17, 2008), 
http://www.somethingawful.com/d/legal-threats/jones-soda-lawsuit.php (describing the parody website’s 
response to a threatened trademark infringement suit). 
 3. In the context of this Note, “wrongful online conduct” refers to intentional conduct such as 
tortious acts and to acts, such as infringement, that are treated like torts for the purposes of 
determining whether the court may exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendants. See, e.g., 
Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs, Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1228 (9th Cir. 2011) (applying the Ninth 
Circuit’s personal jurisdiction analysis for cases involving tortious conduct in a copyright infringement 
case because copyright infringement is “tort-like”), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1101 (2012). 
 4. The jurisdiction analysis discussed in this Note is used both by state courts and by federal 
courts deciding state law claims. 
 5. See infra Part II. 
 6. See infra Part II.A. 
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the broadest possible range of cases. Defendants, on the other hand, 
would prefer to limit the court’s reach to those situations in which the 
prospect of suit was reasonably foreseeable—and would prefer to define 
“reasonably foreseeable” as narrowly as possible. 
Courts tend to favor the latter position: The defendant’s ability to 
reasonably foresee the possibility of suit in a specific forum is the most 
touted value in cases involving online conduct.7 But this foundational 
fairness factor has suffered in the struggle. Because cases with the same 
facts have come to opposite results due to the application of conflicting 
tests for jurisdiction, it is very difficult for defendants to predict when 
and where they might be held liable. 
A 2009 case from the District of Connecticut is illustrative.8 That 
case concerned two Yale Law School students who were defamed by 
pseudonymous participants posting to a law school admissions discussion 
forum. The comments began in a thread entitled, “Stupid Bitch to 
Attend Yale Law,” in which participants made sexually explicit, 
derogatory comments about one of the two women.9 Similar threads 
followed.10 When the website’s administrator refused to delete the 
threads from the forum, the women filed suit against him and thirty-nine 
of the participants, alleging publicity given to private life, false light, 
libel, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.11 One participant 
moved to dismiss the claims against him, arguing that his online 
comments alone did not constitute minimum contacts with the forum 
state of Connecticut because he did not anticipate that Connecticut 
residents would view them.12 Nevertheless, the court held that it had 
jurisdiction over him because he had directed his online activities at 
Connecticut: “[A]t the time he wrote the messages he had ‘a pretty good 
idea that some of [the other users of the website] actually were Yale law 
students.’”13 
This conclusion stands in stark contrast to the one made by the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania in a case that arose in the same year 
from those same forum comments. While the first suit was pending, the 
forum’s administrator sued the two women, their lawyers, and the public 
relations agency the two women had hired to clean up their online 
reputations by removing the offending posts.14 The administrator alleged 
 
 7. See infra Part II. 
 8. Doe I v. Ciolli, 611 F. Supp. 2d 216, 217–18 (D. Conn. 2009). 
 9. David Margolick, Slimed Online, Portfolio.com (Feb. 11, 2009), http://www.portfolio.com/ 
news-markets/national-news/portfolio/2009/02/11/Two-Lawyers-Fight-Cyber-Bullying. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Doe I, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 217–18. 
 12. Id. at 221. 
 13. Id. at 223–24 (alteration in original). 
 14. Ciolli v. Iravani, 651 F. Supp. 2d 356, 360–61 (E.D. Pa. 2009). 
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libel, slander, and false light arising out of the original suit against him by 
the women.15 In dismissing the claims against an employee of the public 
relations agency, whom the plaintiff alleged had written and posted 
defamatory articles about the plaintiff on the agency’s website, the court 
found that the employee had done no more than “make information 
available [on the website] to those who are interested,” and therefore 
had not expressly aimed his conduct at Pennsylvania.16 
Thus, because the two courts applied conflicting tests, two very 
different results arose from similar facts involving the same parties. It 
seems unfair that the website administrator was haled into an out-of-
state forum as a defendant but could not rely on the same protections 
when he was the one who suffered harm. This result also seems 
inappropriate because the administrator was not directly responsible for 
the defamatory statements at issue, but the public relations employee 
was. Regardless of the relative culpability of these two defendants, 
conflicting outcomes like these make it difficult for Internet users to 
know when they might be held liable in a distant forum. As a result, users 
are not on notice as to what conduct will subject them to foreign 
jurisdiction. 
This Note explores the causes of these conflicting outcomes and 
argues that existing tests are not ideal. This Note is divided into four 
parts. Part I discusses the underlying framework of specific jurisdiction in 
cases arising from wrongful online conduct. Part II explains the 
competing interpretations of existing tests for specific jurisdiction in 
these cases and how these interpretations lead to contradictory outcomes. 
Part III discusses the Supreme Court’s most recent statement on specific 
jurisdiction and the effect that decision might have on cases involving the 
Internet. Finally, Part IV explores options for a better test that focuses 
on the defendant’s knowledge and intent, thereby making it clearer to 
Internet users when and where they may be required to answer for their 
actions. 
I.  The Traditional Boundaries of Personal Jurisdiction 
on the Internet 
Whether a state17 may exercise personal jurisdiction over a 
nonresident civil defendant depends on the nature and quality of the 
defendant’s contacts with the forum.18 The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from subjecting a defendant to 
 
 15. Id. at 361. 
 16. Id. at 369–70. However, the court did find that it had jurisdiction over the public relations 
agency itself, based on the fact that the agency conducted business with the forum via its website. Id. at 
366–67. 
 17. See supra note 4. 
 18. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). 
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suit unless the defendant’s contacts with the state are sufficient “such 
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice.’”19 These contacts, in turn, may be 
sufficient to support general jurisdiction, which allows state courts to 
“resolve both matters that originate within the State and those based on 
activities and events elsewhere,”20 or they may support only specific 
jurisdiction, which allows state courts to resolve only those disputes that 
“arise out of or are connected with the activities within the state.”21 A 
state court has general personal jurisdiction over its citizens and those 
who are domiciled in the state, including corporations whose activities 
within the state are sufficiently systematic and continuous.22  
A state court has specific personal jurisdiction over defendants 
located outside of the state and whose in-state activities do not rise to the 
level required for general jurisdiction23 but do constitute the “minimum 
contacts” required by due process.24 Minimum contacts exist where 
(1) the defendant purposefully availed herself of the forum state, (2) the 
plaintiff’s injuries arose out of the defendant’s forum-related activities, 
and (3) exercising jurisdiction does not offend “traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice.”25 This test, particularly the third prong, is 
based on the notion that personal jurisdiction is proper only where a 
defendant could reasonably foresee, on the basis of her relationships and 
obligations in the forum, that she might be haled into court in that forum 
in order to answer for her conduct.26 Courts frequently note that 
jurisdiction is not reasonably foreseeable to a defendant whose contacts 
with the forum state are merely “random” or “fortuitous.”27 
In many cases alleging intentional, wrongful actions conducted over 
the Internet, plaintiffs must rely on specific jurisdiction because many 
such cases involve defendants who are located outside of the forum state 
and who are not otherwise subject to general jurisdiction there. In these 
cases, the defendant’s only contacts with the forum state are the wrongful 
conduct and, if the conduct involved a website, the relationship between 
the forum and that website. But courts have difficulty applying the 
minimum contacts analysis in cases arising from online conduct because 
 
 19. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
 20. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2787 (2011) (plurality opinion). 
 21. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319. 
 22. Id. at 317; see also J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2787. 
 23. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2787. 
 24. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980); Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. 
 25. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472–74 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen, 
444 U.S. at 291–92; Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. 
 26. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. 
 27. See, e.g., id. at 295 (holding that an Oklahoma court could not exercise personal jurisdiction 
over a nonresident corporation whose only contact with Oklahoma was one “fortuitous” event). 
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it is difficult to define purposeful availment in that context. Many early 
decisions found purposeful availment based on nothing more than the 
creation of a website that could be viewed in the forum state.28 However, 
courts subsequently have realized that such a rule is too broad because it 
creates jurisdiction anywhere in the world that a website can be viewed.29 
Such a rule, these courts reason, places too high a burden on those who 
operate and maintain websites.30 As a result, courts have adopted two 
more restrictive tests for jurisdiction resulting from online conduct: the 
Zippo “sliding scale” test and the Calder “effects” test. 
A. The ZIPPO Sliding Scale of Interactivity 
The sliding scale test for purposeful availment was created in Zippo 
Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc. in 1997 by the District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania.31 Ever since then, courts across 
the country have widely applied the Zippo test.32 
The Zippo court concluded that due process permits specific 
personal jurisdiction in cases arising from online conduct based on a 
sliding scale of the nature and quality of the activity the defendant 
conducts over the Internet.33 Specifically, the scale focuses on the website 
or other medium through which the defendant acted, rather than on the 
defendant’s acts themselves. The court defined one end of the scale, 
where jurisdiction is clearly proper, as “knowing and repeated” 
transmission of files,34 and the other end, where jurisdiction clearly is not 
proper, as simply posting information on a passive website.35 In the 
 
 28. E.g., Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1333 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (“Clearly, 
CyberGold has obtained the website for the purpose of, and in anticipation that, internet users, 
searching the internet for websites, will access CyberGold’s website and eventually sign up on 
CyberGold’s mailing list. Although CyberGold characterizes its activity as merely maintaining a 
‘passive website,’ its intent is to reach all internet users, regardless of geographic location.”); Inset Sys., 
Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn. 1996) (“The Internet as well as toll-free 
numbers are designed to communicate with people and their businesses in every state. Advertisement 
on the Internet can reach as many as 10,000 Internet users within Connecticut alone. Further, once 
posted on the Internet, unlike television and radio advertising, the advertisement is available 
continuously to any Internet user. ISI has therefore, purposefully availed itself of the privilege of 
doing business within Connecticut.”). 
 29. See, e.g., ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 712 (4th Cir. 2002).  
 30. Id. 
 31. 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123–24 (W.D. Pa. 1997). 
 32. A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction and the Internet: Returning to Traditional Principles to 
Analyze Network-Mediated Contacts, 2006 U. Ill. L. Rev. 71, 80. 
 33. 952 F. Supp. at 1124. 
 34. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1265 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding specific 
personal jurisdiction in a trademark dispute over a defendant whose sole contact with the forum state, 
Ohio, was the systematic, continuous transmission of software files to users throughout the country via 
the plaintiff’s Ohio-based Internet service). 
 35. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124. 
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middle are interactive websites that allow some input from users.36 In the 
case of such websites, whether personal jurisdiction is proper depends on 
the level of interactivity and the commercial nature of that activity.37 
The facts of Zippo illustrate how the sliding scale may be applied. 
There, a Pennsylvania plaintiff brought a trademark infringement suit 
against a California defendant that did not have any offices, employees, 
or agents in Pennsylvania, but that did advertise to Pennsylvania 
residents via its website.38 It is not clear whether that advertising was 
specifically targeted at or constructed for a Pennsylvania audience, or 
whether the website was merely viewable by Pennsylvania residents.39 
Additionally, two percent of the defendant’s paying subscribers resided 
in Pennsylvania, and it had contracts with two Pennsylvania Internet-
service providers to permit their subscribers to access its service.40 
Applying the sliding interactivity scale, the court determined that the 
defendant had done more than simply operate a website viewable in 
Pennsylvania or advertise in Pennsylvania via that website. By selling 
user subscriptions to Pennsylvania residents and contracting with 
Pennsylvania Internet-service providers, the court found that the 
defendant had purposefully availed itself of Pennsylvania law and could 
therefore reasonably foresee being haled into court there.41 The court 
reasoned that the defendant’s contacts with the state were not 
“fortuitous” because the defendant had actively processed applications 
from Pennsylvania subscribers and therefore knew that it would be 
transmitting information into the state.42 
Determining where a specific case falls on the Zippo sliding scale is 
far from an exact science. Courts disagree on the very meaning of 
“passivity” and “interactivity.” Though the Zippo court defined passive 
websites as those with which users cannot interact in any way,43 and 
although most courts would place an online forum to which users can 
post comments closer to the “interactive” side of the scale, in one case 
the Eighth Circuit categorized such a forum as “merely passive” because 
“users may actually only post information” on a forum.44 The content on 
the website in that case was almost entirely user-driven: The website’s 
only purpose was to serve as a repository for consumer complaints 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 1126. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 1124. 
 44. Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 796 (8th Cir. 2010). 
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posted by visitors to the site.45 By contrast, a federal district court in 
California determined that a company’s website and Facebook page 
(used to advertise the sale of its products in states including California) 
together were sufficiently interactive to permit the exercise of specific 
jurisdiction over the company in California.46 The content on the website 
and the Facebook page was generated almost entirely by the company 
rather than by visitors.47 These two cases are far from the only example of 
the confusion surrounding the Zippo sliding scale’s categories. 
B. CALDER, KEETON, and the Effects Test 
Many courts addressing jurisdiction over wrongful acts conducted 
on the Internet invoke the Supreme Court’s “effects test” from Calder v. 
Jones48 and Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.49 in order to determine 
whether the defendant has purposefully availed herself of the forum 
state, even though the effects test was not created explicitly to address 
online conduct.50 This test is usually referred to as the “Calder effects 
test” without mention of Keeton, though the facts of Keeton do affect 
application of the test, as will be discussed in more detail later in this 
Note.51 
The Calder plaintiff, an actress famous for her role in the Partridge 
Family television show, sued the National Enquirer magazine, its 
president, and one of its reporters for libel after the magazine published 
an article claiming that she drank too heavily to fulfill her professional 
obligations.52 The defendants argued that they did not have sufficient 
minimum contacts with California to support the state’s exercise of 
jurisdiction.53 The Court disagreed. The most important factor in this 
conclusion was that although the magazine had a national circulation, its 
largest circulation was in California.54 The other relevant contacts were 
that the reporter who wrote the article lived in Florida but relied 
primarily on information gathered through telephone calls to sources in 
California,55 and that the same reporter had called California to read a 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. Wine Grp. LLC v. Levitation Mgmt., LLC, No. 2:11-1704-WBS-JFM, 2011 WL 4738335, 
at * 6–7 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2011). 
 47. Id. 
 48. 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
 49. 465 U.S. 770 (1984). 
 50. In fact, the Supreme Court has never made a definitive statement on Internet jurisdiction. 
Spencer, supra note 32, at 73. 
 51. See infra Part II.A. 
 52. 465 U.S. at 784, 788 n.9. 
 53. Id. at 790. 
 54. Id. at 785. 
 55. Id.  
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draft of the article to the plaintiff’s husband.56 By contrast, the president 
of the magazine did not have any contacts with California except for 
having traveled there twice on vacation.57 He reviewed, edited, and 
approved the article about the plaintiff while in Florida.58 
In arriving at the conclusion that these contacts satisfied due process 
and supported the exercise of jurisdiction over all three defendants, the 
Court noted the story’s particular contacts with California: It concerned 
the California activities of a California resident, focused on her 
California career, and was drawn from California sources.59 Most 
important, the brunt of the harm resulting from the story’s claims was felt 
in California—the harm being emotional distress and damage to the 
plaintiff’s professional reputation.60 The Court did not credit the 
reporter’s and the president’s argument that there should be no 
jurisdiction over them because they were not directly responsible for 
circulation or marketing in California (as they were mere employees 
without control over these things) and because they had no direct 
economic stake in the magazine’s sales in California.61 The Court instead 
focused on the fact that the reporter’s and the president’s harmful 
conduct was intentional, rather than negligent, and was “expressly 
aimed” at California.62 They knew that their article would have a harmful 
effect on the plaintiff and that the brunt of that harm she suffered would 
be felt in California.63 Therefore, the Court found, all three defendants 
could reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.64 
The Court came to the same conclusion in Keeton, a companion 
case decided the same day as Calder.65 In Keeton, the plaintiff sued 
Hustler magazine for libelous statements published in five separate 
issues.66 Hustler, an Ohio corporation whose primary place of business 
was California, circulated 10,000 to 15,000 copies of its magazine in New 
Hampshire each month.67 The Court concluded that the regular 
 
 56. Id. at 785–86. 
 57. Id. at 786. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 788–89. 
 60. Id. at 789–90 (“An individual injured in California need not go to Florida to seek redress from 
persons who, though remaining in Florida, knowingly caused the injury in California.”). 
 61. Id. at 789. 
 62. Id. at 789–90. 
 63. Id. (“Petitioner South wrote and petitioner Calder edited an article that they knew would 
have a potentially devastating impact upon respondent. And they knew that the brunt of that injury 
would be felt by respondent in the State in which she lives and works and in which the National 
Enquirer has its largest circulation.”). 
 64. Id. at 790. 
 65. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 n.13 (1984). 
 66. Id. at 772. 
 67. Id. 
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circulation of magazines in New Hampshire permitted the state to 
exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendants when the libel action 
was based on the magazine’s contents.68 Unlike in Calder, the bulk of the 
harm in Keeton did not occur in the forum state, because the plaintiff was 
not a resident of that state and herself had only minimal contacts with 
New Hampshire.69 Nevertheless, the Court found that the magazine’s 
circulation in New Hampshire was sufficient to constitute purposeful 
availment because the magazine had “continuously and deliberately” 
exploited the New Hampshire market and could reasonably anticipate 
being haled into court as a result.70 
C. How the Two Tests Interact 
Applying the Zippo test calls for a determination of whether the 
defendant’s website was generally directed at the forum state through 
advertising, engaging in business in the forum, or otherwise knowingly 
interacting with residents of the forum.71 The effects test is applied quite 
differently. Though the factors considered under Zippo may be relevant 
to the effects test, the latter test considers additional factors. Each circuit 
seems to have its own formulation of the effects test, but all of the tests 
take roughly the same form, asking whether (1) the out-of-state defendant 
committed an intentional act, (2) the act was expressly aimed at the 
forum state, and (3) the defendant knew that the brunt of the injury 
would be felt in the forum state.72 
Both the Zippo sliding scale and the Calder effects tests turn on 
whether the defendant expressly aimed her conduct at the forum state. 
Despite this overlap, or perhaps because of it, courts disagree on how the 
two tests interact in determining whether the court may exercise specific 
jurisdiction. Some courts start by identifying the type of conduct at issue 
and then, if the cause of action is defamation or another intentional tort, 
apply Calder, but substitute the Zippo analysis for Calder’s express 
 
 68. Id. at 773–74. 
 69. Id. at 772–73, 779. 
 70. Id. at 781. 
 71. See, e.g., ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 714 (4th Cir. 2002) 
(“Thus, adopting and adapting the Zippo model, we conclude that a State may, consistent with due 
process, exercise judicial power over a person outside of the State when that person (1) directs 
electronic activity into the State, (2) with the manifested intent of engaging in business or other 
interactions within the State, and (3) that activity creates, in a person within the State, a potential 
cause of action cognizable in the State’s courts. Under this standard, a person who simply places 
information on the Internet does not subject himself to jurisdiction in each State into which the 
electronic signal is transmitted and received.”); see also Spencer, supra note 32, at 80–82. 
 72. E.g., Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 796 (8th Cir. 2010); Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 
703 (7th Cir. 2010); Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063, 1072 (10th Cir. 
2008); Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir. 
2006); IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 265–66 (3d Cir. 1998). 
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aiming prong.73 Other courts apply both Calder and Zippo independently 
and then attempt to balance the results of both tests in coming to a 
conclusion.74 Some courts apply only one test or the other.75 Additionally, 
not all courts agree with the Zippo court that Internet jurisdiction 
requires its own test. In fact, some courts have explicitly stated that 
creating a separate test for Internet cases is inappropriate because 
existing principles are sufficient.76 This confusion over the proper test is 
only the beginning of the problem: Courts also disagree as to how to 
apply the elements of each test. 
II.  Existing Tests: Conflicting Application and 
Confusing Results 
Courts addressing personal jurisdiction for intentional, wrongful 
online conduct face three major questions. First, they struggle to define 
the scope of the conduct that is relevant to determining whether the 
defendant expressly aimed her actions at the forum state. Second, while 
most courts will not exercise jurisdiction unless the defendant was aware 
of the plaintiff’s geographical location, an increasing number of cases 
have found jurisdiction where the defendant was unaware of the 
plaintiff’s specific location but nevertheless knew that the brunt of the 
harm caused by her actions would be felt in a particular place. Finally, 
courts do not agree on how much harm must be felt in the forum state. 
A. Should the Express Aiming Inquiry Consider Facts Beyond the 
Defendant’s Wrongful Actions? 
The scope of the express aiming inquiry is the most significant 
source of controversy in analyzing personal jurisdiction for wrongful 
online conduct. Courts disagree on whether and to what extent facts 
beyond the defendant’s wrongful actions are relevant. The three most 
common issues are (1) whether to consider the aim of the website or 
 
 73. E.g., ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 714; Gorman v. Jacobs, 597 F. Supp. 2d 541, 547 (E.D. Pa. 2009) 
(citing Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 262–63 (4th Cir. 2002)). 
 74. E.g., Broadvoice, Inc. v. TP Innovations LLC, 733 F. Supp. 2d 219, 225–26 (D. Mass. 2010); 
Atkinson v. McLaughlin, 343 F. Supp. 2d 868, 874–78 (D.N.D. 2004). 
 75. E.g., Tamburo, 601 F.3d at 703 n.7 (applying Calder and declining to apply Zippo in a 
defamation case); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419–20 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying 
Zippo and declining to apply Calder in a trademark infringement case). 
 76. E.g., Tamburo, 601 F.3d at 703 n.7 (“[W]e hesitate to fashion a special jurisdictional test for 
Internet-based cases. Calder speaks directly to personal jurisdiction in intentional-tort cases; the 
principles articulated there can be applied to cases involving tortious conduct committed over the 
Internet.”); see Catherine Ross Dunham, Zippo-ing the Wrong Way: How the Internet Has Misdirected 
the Federal Courts in Their Personal Jurisdiction Analysis, 43 U.S.F. L. Rev. 559, 584 (2009) (“The 
Zippo sliding scale offers the most compelling example of why functional doctrine should not be 
supplanted to address the societal changes brought forth through technology.”). 
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other online medium through which the defendant acted; (2) the effect of 
a website’s national, rather than state-specific, aim; and (3) whether 
website users should be treated differently than website owners. 
1. General vs. Specific Conduct  
Most effects tests, as stated by various courts, seem to require only 
that the tortious or wrongful conduct itself is expressly aimed at the 
forum state,77 but in applying this requirement, courts often consider—
sometimes more carefully than any other factor—the forum-specific 
contacts of the website or other online medium chosen by the 
defendant.78 Similarly, the Zippo analysis is limited to the online medium 
through which the defendant carries out her conduct and gives little 
attention to the wrongful conduct itself.79 Though it might not be courts’ 
intent, focusing on acts beyond the wrongful conduct at issue strongly 
favors defendants, because requiring express aiming of conduct besides 
the wrongful conduct makes the location or amount of harm suffered 
irrelevant or, at least, far less significant.80 As a result, even when all of a 
plaintiff’s harm occurs in the forum state, she might be unable to 
establish personal jurisdiction there, and because the effects test prevents 
specific jurisdiction in a forum unless it is the location of the brunt of the 
harm, such a plaintiff is left with only those forums in which the 
defendant is subject to general jurisdiction.  
Interestingly, then, even though Calder, Keeton, and Zippo all 
resolved the jurisdiction issue in the plaintiffs’ favor, the application of 
those cases to Internet cases increases the plaintiff’s burden. The 
plaintiff’s burden is higher in part because, although Keeton is rarely 
mentioned by courts applying the effects test to wrongful acts conducted 
over the Internet, Keeton silently influences their application of Calder. 
The Keeton reasoning depended almost entirely on the defendant 
magazine’s circulation in the forum, as the harm felt in the forum was not 
likely to be significant.81 But Calder depended at least as much on the 
location of the brunt of the harm as it did on the defendants’ more 
general targeting of the forum state.82 Courts that require more contact 
with the forum state than merely the tortious act appear to be focusing 
 
 77. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 78. E.g., Grand River Enters. Six Nations, Ltd. v. Pryor, 425 F.3d 158, 166 (2d Cir. 2005) (“No 
single event or contact connecting defendant to the forum state need be demonstrated; rather, the 
totality of all defendant’s contacts with the forum state must indicate that the exercise of jurisdiction 
would be proper.” (quoting Cutco Indus., Inc. v. Naughton, 806 F.2d 361, 365 (2d Cir. 1986)). 
 79. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997). 
 80. See Spencer, supra note 32, at 100. 
 81. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 780–81 (1984). 
 82. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789–90 (1984). 
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on the general circumstances, namely the extent of magazine circulation, 
without which the Keeton facts would not have created jurisdiction. 
For example, the Third Circuit requires that “[t]he defendant 
expressly aimed his tortious conduct at the forum such that the forum 
can be said to be the focal point of the tortious activity.”83 However, in 
Internet cases the Third Circuit often focuses on all of the defendant’s 
contacts with the forum. Indeed, because that court has ruled that “the 
mere allegation that the plaintiff feels the effect of the defendant’s 
tortious conduct in the forum because the plaintiff is located there is 
insufficient to satisfy Calder,”84 it is difficult, if not impossible, to find 
specific jurisdiction without looking to contacts beyond the wrongful 
conduct itself. 
Plaintiffs bringing suit in district courts in the Third Circuit must 
provide other evidence that the defendant targeted the forum state.85 
Marten v. Godwin is illustrative.86 There, the plaintiff took online courses 
offered by the defendant school but was expelled from the program 
because the school believed he had plagiarized multiple assignments.87 
The plaintiff sued the school in federal district court in Pennsylvania for 
defamation based on the plagiarism accusation.88 The school’s sole 
contacts with Pennsylvania were the emails the plaintiff received there 
from the school, notifying him of the plagiarism allegations and the 
expulsion.89 The Third Circuit held that the defendants’ knowledge that 
the plaintiff resided in Pennsylvania and the sending of emails to him in 
Pennsylvania were not sufficient to constitute express aiming.90 
The Marten court did not elaborate as to what behavior would have 
constituted express aiming. However, it seems likely that nothing short of 
establishing more or greater business relationships in the state would 
have sufficed. Courts that require “something more” than mere 
knowledge that harm would be felt in the forum state often focus on 
whether the website advertised specifically to residents of the forum 
state, the percentage of website users residing in the forum state, or other 
indicators that the website itself was directed at the forum.91  
 
 83. Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 297 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 
155 F.3d 254, 265–66 (3d Cir. 1998)). 
 84. IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 263 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 85. Id. at 265. 
 86. 499 F.3d 290. 
 87. Id. at 293–94. 
 88. Id. at 294. 
 89. Id. at 294, 298–99. 
 90. Id. at 298–99. 
 91. See Spencer, supra note 32, at 101–02. 
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2. Nationally vs. Locally Focused Websites  
Treatment of nationally focused websites and of plaintiffs with 
national reputations is one of the most problematic aspects of the express 
aiming inquiry. The question is whether the defendant could be aware 
that her conduct would cause harm in the forum state, and many courts 
find such awareness lacking when the website’s or the plaintiff’s 
connection with that state is not obvious or when the site or plaintiff has 
a connection with multiple states. This Subpart discusses the issue of 
nationally focused websites, while Part II.B.1 discusses plaintiffs with 
national reputations. 
A website might be considered nationally targeted due to its 
content, its advertising, or both. For example, many courts would hold 
that a site hosting a forum discussing a nationally relevant, state-
nonspecific topic such as U.S. foreign policy is directed at a national 
audience rather than at any specific state. Such a conclusion is especially 
likely where all of the advertising on the site is nationally relevant, such 
as for products commonly available across the country. Another 
consideration is whether the website itself is advertised or marketed in a 
state-specific way. 
All of these factors affected the outcome in Gorman v. Jacobs, 
where a federal district court in Pennsylvania determined that it did not 
have jurisdiction over defendants who had posted on a nationally aimed 
Internet forum.92 In that case, a podiatrist sued three other podiatrists for 
comments they made on a podiatry news forum, PM News, in response 
to an article in which the plaintiff had commented about the rising costs 
of medical malpractice insurance.93 The defendants posted comments 
about the article, contending that the plaintiff had served as an expert 
witness for plaintiffs in frivolous lawsuits and that he had given false 
testimony.94 The plaintiff sued for defamation, false light, and intentional 
and negligent infliction of emotional distress.95 The court applied both 
Calder and Zippo and noted that “how individuals use the web site is 
equally, if not more, important than the features of the web site 
itself. . . . [T]he defendant’s Internet activity—whether it be web site 
operation or use—must evince an intent to interact with the forum to 
justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction.”96 The court determined that 
the PM News website was sufficiently interactive to make website users 
amenable to personal jurisdiction, but that jurisdiction was not proper 
because the website was not specifically aimed at Pennsylvania.97 The 
 
 92. 597 F. Supp. 2d 541, 551 (E.D. Pa. 2009). 
 93. Id. at 543–45. 
 94. Id. at 544–45. 
 95. Id. at 545. 
 96. Id. at 546–48. 
 97. Id. at 549–51. 
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website did not inform users that comments would be directed into any 
specific state; therefore, using the website did not establish an intent to 
interact with Pennsylvania—or, presumably, any other state.98  
The fact that the website’s intended audience was the national 
podiatry community at large, rather than any specific state, was 
especially harmful to the plaintiff’s case. Even though some of the 
comments mentioned Pennsylvania, the court determined that these 
“passing references” were made as part of arguments that actually 
addressed national issues and therefore did not establish that the 
comments were expressly aimed at Pennsylvania.99  
3. Website Owners vs. Users 
The distinction between the website’s and the defendant’s express 
aiming is especially problematic where the defendant is a user rather 
than the owner or operator of the website or other online medium in 
question. Courts contend that it does not matter whether the website 
targets the plaintiff’s chosen forum if the defendant is unaware of the 
website’s aim—and in many cases, that aim will be apparent only to the 
website’s owner or operator. For instance, in Gorman, the court 
concluded that even if the plaintiff could prove that a substantial 
percentage of the website’s users were from Pennsylvania, that would not 
create jurisdiction in Pennsylvania because information about users’ 
locations would be available only to the website’s owners but not to users 
such as the defendants.100 Therefore, the court reasoned, the defendants 
would not have been aware that their comments were aimed at 
Pennsylvania.101 
But a website’s intended audience is much less relevant where the 
defendant is a website user rather than an owner. That users are often 
unaware of the location of a website’s audience does not mean that they 
are unaware of their target’s location. Additionally, whether the website 
is actually directed at a particular state might not be relevant to users. 
The fact that websites are viewable anywhere in the country might lead 
users to believe that their comments will reach their intended target. 
Indeed, this assumption often appears to be the very motivation 
behind defendants’ decisions to make defamatory statements on the 
Internet. In cases such as Tamburo v. Dworkin,102 the defendants’ 
statements would have served little purpose if they could not reach the 
plaintiff’s state of residence. In that case, the plaintiff took data, which he 
 
 98. Id. at 549–50. 
 99. Id. at 550–51. 
 100. Id. at 550. 
 101. Id. 
 102. 601 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2010). 
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argued was in the public domain, from the defendants’ websites and used 
it in his dog-breeding software.103 In a subsequent defamation lawsuit, he 
alleged that the defendants “engaged in a concerted campaign of blast 
emails and postings on their websites accusing him of stealing their data 
and urging dog enthusiasts to boycott his products.”104 In finding that the 
federal district court in Illinois had jurisdiction over the defendants, the 
Seventh Circuit applied Calder—expressly declining to apply Zippo—
and found that the defendants had expressly aimed their conduct at 
Illinois because they had purposefully targeted the plaintiff and his 
business in Illinois with the intent of harming his business and reputation 
there.105 It did not matter to the court that the defendants’ comments 
were available more widely on the Internet.106 In fact, the opinion 
concluded that the defendants intended to harm the plaintiff’s Illinois 
business by communicating with a wider audience.107 
B. Must the Defendant Know Where the Plaintiff Was Located? 
Even when the website in question is directed at a specific forum, 
the express aiming prong and the knowledge portion of the brunt-of-the-
harm prong may not be satisfied. When the plaintiff has a national (or 
multistate) reputation or business, it may be difficult for the defendant to 
determine where the plaintiff resides or primarily does business and, 
therefore, to know that her actions will cause harm in that particular 
state. Alternatively, the defendant might be aware that the plaintiff 
resides or does business in only one forum but, thanks to the anonymity 
of the Internet, might be unable to determine which forum that is. Courts 
have declined to exercise specific jurisdiction in both of these scenarios, 
though some are willing to impute knowledge of the plaintiff’s location 
to defendants in the latter scenario. 
1. Plaintiffs with a National Reputation or Business 
The national-reputation issue reared its head in Dring v. Sullivan, 
where the plaintiff alleged that comments made on a Taekwondo 
referees listserv108 were intended to harm his chances in an election to the 
 
 103. Id. at 698. 
 104. Id. at 697. 
 105. Id. at 697, 703 n.7. 
 106. Id. at 707. 
 107. The court likened their conduct to that in Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 
514 F.3d 1063 (10th Cir. 2008), a case in which the Tenth Circuit found jurisdiction over a defendant 
based on communications with eBay in California intended to halt an online auction created by sellers 
located in Colorado. See Tamburo, 601 F.3d at 706–07. Though the communications were directed first 
at California, their ultimate aim was Colorado. Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1075. 
 108. A listserv is like a forum or bulletin board, but is conducted through email rather than on a 
website. 
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Board of Governors for USA Taekwondo (“USAT”).109 The plaintiff 
brought suit in Maryland, where he lived.110 It is not clear whether the 
defendant had contacts with Maryland beyond his comments on the 
listserv; the court noted that the defendant might have performed work 
in Maryland as a Taekwondo referee but did not decide the issue.111 
Though the jurisdiction question was decided on state law rather than 
federal due process grounds because the requirements of the Maryland 
long-arm statute, which did not extend to the constitutional limits, were 
not met, the court nevertheless found that the defendant’s contacts with 
the forum would not have satisfied federal due process.112 The problem, 
in the court’s view, was that the defendants’ comments on the listserv 
focused on the plaintiff’s national and international activities as part of 
USAT.113 There was no evidence that USAT had any connections with 
Maryland other than having members there.114 Thus, jurisdiction in 
Maryland based on the defendants’ forum comments was not proper.115 
The plaintiff’s national reputation was also a problem in Gorman. 
There, one of the defendants contended that the plaintiff would “travel 
anywhere” in the country to serve as an expert witness, indicating to the 
court that it was the plaintiff’s national, not local, reputation that would 
have been harmed.116 
2. Plaintiffs Whose Residence or Primary Place of Business is 
Unclear 
The defendant’s awareness of the plaintiff’s location can be 
dispositive. In Tamburo, for example, the Seventh Circuit held that the 
district court in Illinois did have jurisdiction over the defendants who 
made defamatory statements about the plaintiff via email and on their 
websites, but did not have jurisdiction over the owner of a listserv to 
which some users had reposted the comments.117 The distinction was that 
the listserv’s owner had no idea that the plaintiff lived in Illinois, while 
the other defendants clearly did: At least one defendant posted the 
plaintiff’s business address on his website.118  
In other cases where it is unclear that the defendant knows the 
plaintiff’s geographic location, courts nevertheless find that jurisdiction 
 
 109. 423 F. Supp. 2d 540, 542–43 (D. Md. 2006). 
 110. Id. at 542. 
 111. Id. at 546. 
 112. Id. at 547, 549. 
 113. Id. at 548. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 549. 
 116. Gorman v. Jacobs, 597 F. Supp. 2d 541, 550 (E.D. Pa. 2009). 
 117. Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 708 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 118. Id. at 706, 708. 
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over the defendant is proper.119 These courts emphasize the difficulty in 
pinpointing someone’s location when the parties’ only contacts occur 
over the Internet and conclude that the defendant’s intent to harm a 
specific person is more important than any intent to direct that harm at a 
known location. In a sense, knowledge of the plaintiff’s location is 
imputed to these defendants because they intend to cause harm to a 
specific person and know that the resulting harm must therefore be felt 
in a specific place. 
In some cases, the knowledge requirement is loosened in a technical 
but not necessarily substantive sense. One such case is Jones v. Dirty 
World Entertainment Recordings, LLC, in which visitors to an online 
forum made disparaging comments about the sexual history and 
reputation of a Cincinnati Bengals cheerleader and schoolteacher.120 The 
website’s owner personally responded to these postings and made some 
negative comments of his own.121 The federal district court in Kentucky 
denied the website owner’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s defamation 
claim for lack of personal jurisdiction, stating: 
The defendants publish invidious and salacious posts by visitors to the 
web site, . . . they respond to those posts with their own comments, and 
they thereby encourage and generate further posts by readers. In 
effect, a dialogue is created. It is also a fair inference that the salacious 
posts will invite hits from residents of the region where the subject of 
the posts lives and/or works.122 
In essence, the court concluded that targeting of the forum state is 
inevitable where the defendant directs “invidious and salacious” 
comments at a citizen of that forum—a conclusion that echoes Keeton. 
The court then found that the defendants “knew that the invidious 
statements they posted would cause distress and harm to the plaintiff 
where she lived and/or worked” because they knew the brunt of the 
harm to the plaintiff and her career would be felt in the state in which 
she lived.123 The defendants argued that it was not reasonably foreseeable 
that the harm would be felt in Kentucky: They assumed that because the 
plaintiff was a cheerleader for a Cincinnati sports team, she must have 
lived in Ohio.124 The court discredited this argument because the Greater 
 
 119. E.g., Verizon Online Servs., Inc. v. Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d 601, 620 (E.D. Va. 2002) 
(“Defendants allegedly purposefully transmitted millions of UBE to Verizon’s e-mail servers. They 
cannot seek to escape answering for these actions by simply pleading ignorance as to where these 
se[r]vers were physically located.”); MaryCLE, LLC v. First Choice Internet, Inc., 890 A.2d 818, 834 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006) (“First Choice cannot plead lack of purposeful availment because the 
‘nature’ of the Internet does not allow it to know the geographic location of its email recipients.”). 
 120. 766 F. Supp. 2d 828, 830 (E.D. Ky. 2011). 
 121. Id. at 831. 
 122. Id. at 833. 
 123. Id. at 835. 
 124. Id. at 833. 
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Cincinnati area included the Kentucky city in which the plaintiff lived.125 
Therefore, because it was reasonably foreseeable that the harm would be 
felt in the Greater Cincinnati area, it was reasonably foreseeable that it 
would be felt in the corresponding part of Kentucky.126 
Dirty World might not have loosened the knowledge requirement as 
much as the court’s language implies. The defendants arguably did know 
the specific location in which the plaintiff’s harm would be felt and 
simply were incorrect about the geographic definition of that location. 
However, other courts have definitively stated that even when the 
defendant does not know in which geographic forum the plaintiff resides, 
jurisdiction may still be exercised so long as the defendant’s conduct was 
aimed at that forum. This was the case in Facebook, Inc. v. ConnectU 
LLC,127 where the plaintiffs sued the defendants in a federal district court 
in California for fraud and unfair competition, among other causes of 
action.128 The suit alleged that the defendants created a program designed 
to falsify login information on Facebook, import profile and email 
account information from registered Facebook users, and send 
misleading emails using those email addresses.129 The defendants argued 
that they were not subject to specific jurisdiction in California because 
they were not aware that Facebook resided in California, believing 
instead that the company operated out of Massachusetts.130 The court 
disagreed and found that jurisdiction was proper: 
The mere fact that the Internet provided [the defendants] a tool by 
which they could carry out their conduct against Facebook without first 
making efforts to learn its geographic location is not a reason to excuse 
them from jurisdiction to which they would otherwise be subject. . . . 
Here, there is no dispute that [the defendants] were fully aware that 
Facebook existed, and that they specifically targeted their conduct 
against Facebook. That they were able to do so while remaining 
ignorant of Facebook’s precise location may render this case factually 
distinct from prior precedents finding jurisdiction for acts of express 
aiming, but not in a manner that warrants a different result.131 
The court did go on to note, however, that a defendant is not 
necessarily subject to jurisdiction in any forum in which the plaintiff is 
located merely because that defendant has used the Internet to “attack” 
 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 834. 
 127. No. 507-CV-01389-RS, 2007 WL 2326090 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2007). 
 128. Plaintiffs’ [Proposed] Second Amended Complaint for Violation of California Penal Code 
§ 502(C), California and Massachusetts Common Law Misappropriation/Unfair Competition, 
Violation of Massachusetts General Law 93a, 18 U.S.C. § 1030, and 15 U.S.C. §§ 7704 and 7705, at 
¶¶ 46–75, Facebook, 2007 WL 4463731 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2007) (No. 507-CV-01389-RS). 
 129. Id. at *2. 
 130. Id. at *5. 
 131. Facebook, 2007 WL 4463731, at *5–6. 
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the plaintiff.132 Jurisdiction might not be proper where the plaintiff 
actively concealed their location or claimed to be present in more than 
one forum “based on a wide-flung network of servers,” or where the 
defendant had no reason to believe that the plaintiff was located outside 
the defendant’s forum.133 
Though courts are increasingly willing to impute some knowledge of 
the plaintiff’s location to defendants in wrongful online conduct cases, 
there is a limit to how far courts will go. The defendant must have some 
actual knowledge of the plaintiff’s identity, as illustrated by the 
California Supreme Court’s opinion in Pavlovich v. Superior Court.134 
There, the plaintiff, a nonprofit trade association formed by the DVD 
industry, was the sole licensee of a system used to encrypt copyrighted 
material on DVDs.135 The defendant, a computer engineering student, 
created a program that could be used to circumvent this encryption 
system and freely distributed his program’s source code via a website.136 
The plaintiff contended that the defendant had sufficient knowledge to 
foresee that his actions would cause harm in California. The argument 
was twofold: First, it was foreseeable that the program would be used to 
pirate copyrighted material, which would cause harm to the 
entertainment industries centered in California.137 And second, it was 
foreseeable that distribution of the source code would cause harm to any 
licensees of the encryption system, which the defendant should have 
known were located in California due to the prevalence of computer and 
electronics companies there.138  
The court disagreed with both prongs of this argument. First, even if 
the defendant did foresee that third parties might use his source code to 
pirate copyrighted material and thereby harm copyright holders, this 
awareness would not satisfy the express aiming requirement because the 
defendant did nothing to encourage third parties to engage in piracy.139 In 
other words, the court refused to hold the defendant liable for the 
actions of third parties absent some sort of activity encouraging them to 
take those actions. Second, and more important for purposes of this 
Note, the defendant did not have sufficient knowledge of the licensee’s 
presence in California because the prevalence of computer companies in 
that state was not enough to overcome the fact that the defendant had no 
information about the identify of any specific license holder.140 
 
 132. Id. at *6 n.4. 
 133. Id. 
 134. 58 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2002). 
 135. Id. at 5. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 11. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 11–12. 
 140. Id. at 12. 
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The key difference between Facebook and Pavlovich is that the 
Facebook defendants knew exactly who their actions would harm: the 
Facebook corporation. The Pavlovich defendant, on the other hand, 
knew that his actions would cause harm to someone but had no idea who 
specifically that would be.  
Not all courts will find the defendant’s awareness of the plaintiff’s 
identity but not location sufficient to satisfy the express aiming prong. In 
fact, some courts have declined to exercise jurisdiction where the 
defendant was aware of both the plaintiff’s identity and location.141 
Though courts generally may be relaxing the knowledge requirement, 
this aspect of specific jurisdiction in cases involving wrongful online 
conduct is far from settled. 
C. How Much Harm Is Enough? 
Courts applying the effects test agree that the defendant must be 
aware that the brunt of the harm will be felt in the forum state. There is 
less agreement as to how much harm is required to satisfy this prong. 
Difficulty applying this prong stems from the conflicting facts of Calder 
and Keeton. In Calder, it was clear that the plaintiff felt the brunt of the 
harm in the forum state, while in Keeton the Supreme Court seemed 
concerned with finding a forum for the plaintiff even though the brunt of 
the harm was felt elsewhere. The problem in Keeton was that the plaintiff 
could not turn to any other forum if jurisdiction could not be established 
in New Hampshire: The statute of limitations barred her libel claim in 
Ohio, where the magazine was published, and her invasion of privacy 
claim in New York, where she resided and probably felt the brunt of her 
injury.142 Thus, the Court noted, “It is undoubtedly true that the bulk of 
the harm done to petitioner occurred outside New Hampshire. But that 
will be true in almost every libel action brought somewhere other than 
the plaintiff’s domicile.”143 The Court went on to say that libel claims 
should not be limited to a plaintiff’s home forum and that the amount of 
harm suffered by the plaintiff in New Hampshire was sufficient to satisfy 
due process.144 
 
 141. See, e.g., Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 796–97 (8th Cir. 2010) (“The Johnsons allege that 
Heineman stated on www.ComplaintBoards.com that Sue Johnson and Cozy Kittens operated from 
Unionville, Missouri . . . . Although we accept this allegation as true, alone, it fails to show that 
Heineman uniquely or expressly aimed her statements at Missouri. The statements were aimed at the 
Johnsons; the inclusion of ‘Missouri’ in the posting was incidental and not performed for the very 
purpose of having their consequences felt in Missouri. There is no evidence that the www.Complaints 
Board.com website specifically targets Missouri, or that the content of Heineman’s alleged postings 
specifically targeted Missouri.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 142. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 772 n.1 (1984). 
 143. Id. at 780. 
 144. Id.  
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Keeton thus stands for the notion that the “brunt” of the harm does 
not mean the majority of the harm. The Ninth Circuit relied on Keeton in 
Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme when it 
concluded, “If a jurisdictionally sufficient amount of harm is suffered in 
the forum state, it does not matter that even more harm might have been 
suffered in another state.”145 In that case, Yahoo!, a Delaware 
corporation doing business principally in California, provided a variety of 
Internet services to its users, including the ability to post items for 
auction.146 These services were provided in multiple countries.147 
Problems arose when some users created online auctions for Nazi 
memorabilia, which it is illegal to sell in France.148 When a French 
organization sued Yahoo! in the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, 
that court issued an order requiring Yahoo! to “take all necessary 
measures to dissuade and render impossible any access” to these auctions 
in French territory.149 Yahoo! did not appeal but instead filed suit in 
federal district court in California, seeking a declaratory judgment that 
the French orders were not enforceable in the United States.150 The Ninth 
Circuit held that jurisdiction over the French organization responsible 
for the French suit was proper in California because Yahoo! had 
experienced a jurisdictionally significant amount of harm there.151 The 
court even stated that jurisdiction may be proper where the bulk of the 
harm occurs outside of the forum.152 Here, the court likely believed that 
Yahoo! felt the most harm in France because the French court’s orders 
primarily concerned Yahoo!’s French websites, but nevertheless held 
that a California court could exercise personal jurisdiction in the case. 
In contrast, other courts do define “brunt” to mean “majority.”153 
Some decisions imply this requirement but do not directly state it. For 
instance, although the Tamburo court stated in a footnote that it was not 
addressing the question of how much harm must be felt in the forum 
state, the outcome depended on the fact that “the whole of the injury was 
suffered in Illinois, and the individual defendants knew that would be the 
case.”154 Reading “brunt” as “majority of the harm” allows courts to 
 
 145. 433 F.3d 1199, 1207 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 146. Id. at 1201. 
 147. Id. at 1202. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. (emphasis removed). 
 150. Id. at 1204. 
 151. Id. at 1207. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Cf. IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 263 (3d Cir. 1998) (“Moreover, Calder 
requires that the ‘brunt’ of the harm be felt in the forum. . . . [Other] cases cast doubt on the assertion 
that a company will feel the ‘brunt’ of a tort injury at its principal place of business when that injury is 
based on damage to contracts or property not centered in the forum.”). 
 154. Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 706 n.9 (7th Cir. 2010). 
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focus solely on the defendant’s actions and ignore the question of 
whether the website itself was directed at the forum state. In this way, the 
brunt-of-the-harm prong offers a solution to many of the problems that 
arise where websites have a national reach or plaintiffs have a national 
reputation.155  
III.  The Impact of J. MCINTYRE MACHINERY, LTD. V. NICASTRO 
In 2011, the Supreme Court handed down its first significant rulings 
on personal jurisdiction in over twenty years.156 As both cases concerned 
conduct that was at most negligent, and both focused on sale of goods 
and the impact of the “stream of commerce” on personal jurisdiction,157 
neither is directly applicable to the type of wrongful conduct at issue in 
this Note.158 However, one of the two, J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. 
Nicastro, concerned specific jurisdiction,159 and as such the general policy 
principles expressed by the Court in that case are relevant to this 
discussion. 
The issue in J. McIntyre was whether a British manufacturer of 
industrial machinery could be required to defend a products liability suit 
in New Jersey state court when one of its machines injured a New Jersey 
resident.160 Six Justices believed that permitting the New Jersey court to 
exercise specific jurisdiction over the manufacturer would violate due 
process but were divided on the reasons why. Three Justices joined 
Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion,161 while another joined Justice 
Breyer’s concurrence.162  
 
 155. See infra Part IV.B. 
 156. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011); J. McIntyre Mach., 
Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) (plurality opinion). The Court’s last significant ruling on 
personal jurisdiction came in Asahi Metal Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
 157. J. McIntyre was a products liability case, and thus would have concerned either negligence or 
strict liability. 131 S. Ct. at 2785. Goodyear was a wrongful death suit predicated on allegations of 
negligence. 131 S. Ct. at 2850. 
 158. Though the Zippo test is used by some courts in every case involving the Internet, regardless 
of the cause of action, see, e.g., Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419–20 (9th Cir. 1997), 
the effects test is usually reserved for cases involving tortious or otherwise wrongful conduct. The 
effects test and stream of commerce branches of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence are separate: 
where one applies, the other does not. Cf. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2785 (“As a general rule, the 
exercise of judicial power is not lawful unless the defendant ‘purposefully avails itself of the privilege 
of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.’ 
There may be exceptions, say, for instance, in cases involving an intentional tort. But the general rule 
is applicable in this products-liability case, and the so-called ‘stream-of-commerce’ doctrine cannot 
displace it.” (citations omitted)); see also id. at 2787 (distinguishing intentional tort cases from cases 
governed by the general rules of purposeful availment). 
 159. 131 S. Ct. 2780. 
 160. Id. at 2786. 
 161. Id. at 2785. 
 162. Id. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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Justice Kennedy’s opinion focused on the defendant’s actions, not 
his intentions or what might have been foreseeable to him.163 In contrast 
with the Court’s previous opinions on jurisdiction, the J. McIntyre 
plurality minimized the relevance of foreseeability: “The defendant’s 
transmission of goods permits the exercise of jurisdiction only where the 
defendant can be said to have targeted the forum; as a general rule, it is 
not enough that the defendant might have predicted that its goods will 
reach the forum State.”164 For Justice Kennedy, the fact J. McIntyre had 
no contacts with New Jersey beyond the sale of one machine “reveal[ed] 
an intent to serve the U.S. market,” not the New Jersey market.165 Thus, 
New Jersey courts could not exercise personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant because the defendant had never engaged in any activities 
there “that reveal[ed] an intent to invoke or benefit from the protection 
of its laws.”166  
Justice Breyer’s concurrence also centered on the defendant’s 
actions and minimized foreseeability, albeit indirectly, but did not 
require a showing that the defendant intended to submit to the forum 
state’s jurisdiction. Instead, he focused on the defendant’s sales and 
marketing efforts in the state, basing his conclusion that jurisdiction in 
New Jersey was not proper on the fact that there was no “regular flow” 
of sales by the defendant in the state, nor was there “something more” 
beyond sales, such as state-specific advertising.167 Thus, it could not be 
said that the defendant had made any “specific effort” to sell in New 
Jersey.168 Of particular relevance to the discussion in this Note is Justice 
Breyer’s concern that the plurality’s rules—that the defendant must 
“inten[d] to submit to the power of the forum” and must “target the 
forum”—might be too narrow to adequately address the range of sales 
techniques made possible by the Internet: “[W]hat do those standards 
mean when a company targets the world by selling products from its Web 
site? . . . And what if the company markets its products through popup 
advertisements that it knows will be viewed in a forum? Those issues 
have serious commercial consequences but are totally absent in this 
case.”169 
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg strongly criticized the idea that a 
manufacturer may escape specific personal jurisdiction in any state by 
targeting a national market for its products rather than a state-specific 
 
 163. Id. at 2789 (plurality opinion). 
 164. Id. at 2788. 
 165. Id. at 2790. 
 166. Id. at 2791. 
 167. Id. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 2793. 
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market.170 She took particular issue with the plurality’s focus on what was 
fair to the defendant rather than what might be fair to the plaintiff and 
noted that requiring this particular defendant to appear in court in New 
Jersey would be “a reasonable cost of transacting business 
internationally.”171 She would have held that by engaging a subsidiary to 
sell its products throughout the United States, the defendant had 
purposefully availed itself of the U.S. market nationwide and “thereby 
availed itself of the market of all States in which its products were sold by 
its exclusive distributor.”172 After all, “[h]ow could McIntyre UK not 
have intended, by its actions targeting a national market, to sell products 
in the fourth largest destination for imports among all States of the 
United States and the largest scrap metal market?”173  
The impact of J. McIntyre on the specific jurisdiction analysis is not 
yet clear. For one thing, courts will differ over whether to apply Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion, Justice Breyer’s concurrence, or neither.174 And even 
when courts decide which to follow, it is not at all obvious how to apply 
the standards enunciated in either opinion. The pre-J. McIntyre status 
quo likely will prevail in many courts,175 while others might believe the 
case to be a radical departure from past precedent. Indeed, one court 
applying Justice Breyer’s concurrence has already concluded that 
“McIntyre clearly rejects foreseeability as the standard for personal 
jurisdiction.”176 Despite this conclusion, the most J. McIntyre has made 
clear so far is that “[s]ome regular and substantial number of sales needs 
to occur in the forum” in order to support a finding of specific 
jurisdiction based solely on sales.177 
Whether J. McIntyre will cause any court will change its analysis of 
specific jurisdiction in cases involving wrongful online conduct remains 
to be seen. Thus far, none have done so. The Ninth Circuit has explicitly 
stated, and the Supreme Court has implied, that J. McIntyre does not 
 
 170. Id. at 2801 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 171. Id. at 2800–01. 
 172. Id. at 2801. 
 173. Id. (citing Ronan E. Degnan & Mary Kay Kane, The Exercise of Jurisdiction Over and 
Enforcement of Judgments Against Alien Defendants, 39 Hastings L.J. 799, 813–815 (1988)). 
 174. See Megan M. La Belle, The Future of Internet-Related Personal Jurisdiction After Goodyear 
Dunlap Tires v. Brown and J. McIntyre v. Nicastro, 15 J. Internet L. 3, 8 (2012) (explaining that some 
courts will rely on earlier opinions because there was no majority opinion in J. McIntyre, some will 
follow Justice Breyer’s concurrence based on the principle that the narrowest concurrence governs 
where there is no majority, and some will follow Justice Kennedy’s opinion, believing it to be a 
majority opinion). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Windsor v. Spinner Indus. Co., No. JKB-10-114, 2011 WL 5005199, at *5 (D. Md. Oct. 20, 2011). 
 177. See Patrick J. Borchers, J. McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the Incoherence of the 
Minimum Contacts Test, 44 Creighton L. Rev. 1245, 1265 (2011). 
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apply to cases sounding in tort.178 But even if J. McIntyre is not applied 
directly to Internet cases, the debate between Justices Kennedy and 
Ginsburg over the sufficiency of targeting a national, rather than state, 
market has great significance. As has been discussed, the question of 
national versus state targeting is often dispositive in cases involving 
wrongful online conduct.179 Courts that have already expressed a 
preference for one argument or the other surely will cite to J. McIntyre 
for support in future cases. And Justice Breyer’s focus on the plurality’s 
potential impact on online commerce likely will attract the eye of courts 
that are on the fence on the national-targeting issue or that have not yet 
had the opportunity to address it. 
IV.  Creating a Better Test 
Courts have attempted to prevent nationwide jurisdiction over 
Internet users by narrowly defining express aiming and reasonable 
foreseeability. However, the tests currently used to accomplish this 
purpose have actually made it more difficult for defendants to determine 
when and where they may be subject to suit. In order to ensure true 
foreseeability and uniform treatment, courts should rethink their tests for 
specific jurisdiction over online conduct. 
Tests for specific jurisdiction in wrongful online conduct cases can 
avoid the problems described in this Note by applying the following 
principles: (1) the interactivity and aim of the website or other medium 
through which the defendant harmed the plaintiff should not be 
considered as a separate factor; (2) that the plaintiff might have a 
national reputation or businesses does not automatically mean she has 
suffered the same amount of harm in every potential forum; and (3) the 
defendant need not know where the plaintiff is located in order to intend 
to cause her harm in that location. The Facebook court’s succinct 
explanation of this third principle is offered in Part II.B.2 of this Note, 
but the first two principles will be explained further in this Part.  
A. Website Aim and Interactivity Should Be Considered in the 
Correct Context 
First, courts should stop fixating on the aim and interactivity of 
websites. This fixation leads to a number of problems: inadequate 
consideration of the effort the defendant has expended to harm the 
plaintiff, ignorance of the difference between website users and owners, 
and overestimations of the level of effort required to overcome the 
Internet’s lack of physical boundaries to target specific people and 
 
 178. Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1228–29 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 
132 S. Ct. 1101 (2012). 
 179. See supra Part II.A.2. 
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places. These problems will be alleviated—and perhaps solved entirely—
if the aim and interactivity of websites is no longer treated as a separate 
factor in the specific jurisdiction analysis. The question should be 
whether the defendant has expressly taken aim at the forum state, not 
whether the medium through which the defendant acts has done so. 
Thus, while interactivity and aim may be relevant to the express aiming 
inquiry, they should be used as evidence of the defendant’s knowledge 
and intent regarding the plaintiff rather than as a hurdle that must be 
cleared before the defendant can even be considered to have such 
knowledge or intent.  
The first step is to do away with the Zippo sliding scale, which leads 
to counterintuitive results in cases of intentional, wrongful conduct.180 
Instead of asking whether the site is interactive or not, courts should ask 
how much effort the defendant put into using the site to harm the 
plaintiff. For example, a defendant who posts a block of defamatory text 
on her passive website arguably has worked harder to harm the plaintiff 
than has the defendant who posts a defamatory comment on Facebook, 
Twitter, an online forum, or any other, more interactive type of website. 
The former defendant must register a domain name and construct an 
entire website in order to share her statements; the latter defendant 
merely writes a comment on an existing website to which she might have 
no lasting connection and to which she might give little thought.181  
Likewise, courts should not make the website’s general audience 
their primary focus, especially not when the defendant is a website user 
rather than owner and thus has no control over the website’s reach. 
Questions about a website’s general audience come from Calder and 
Keeton, which are most easily analogized with websites delivering news 
 
 180. This Note is hardly the first to propose doing away with the Zippo test. The Zippo sliding 
scale has faced harsh criticism from courts and commentators alike since it was first adopted. See, e.g., 
Howard v. Mo. Bone & Joint Ctr., Inc., 869 N.E.2d 207, 212 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (“We disagree with 
the arbitrary ‘sliding scale’ approach adopted by Zippo . . . .”); Dagesse v. Plant Hotel N.V., 
113 F. Supp. 2d. 211, 222 (D.N.H. 2000); Borchers, supra note 177, at 479 (“At a technical level, there 
are good reasons to doubt whether the Zippo framework really makes much sense.”); Dunham, supra 
note 76, at 583; Michael A. Geist, Is There a There There? Toward Greater Certainty for Internet 
Jurisdiction, 16 Berkeley Tech L.J. 1345, 1377 (2001) (“The problems with the Zippo test are not 
limited to inconsistent and often undesirable outcomes. The test also encourages a perverse behavior 
that runs contrary to public policy related to the Internet and e-commerce.”); Spencer, supra note 32, 
at 74 (“[T]he prevailing analysis embodied in contemporary Zippo-based approaches is fundamentally 
unsound.”). 
 181. For example, consider the Westboro Baptist Church. Its website is entirely passive under the 
Zippo sliding scale, but the comments that church members make on the website are intended to 
inflame readers and have resulted in multiple defamation suits. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 
1213–14 (2011); see also Borchers, supra note 177, at 480 (“To say that jurisdiction exists when the 
publication is in the physical form and not over the Internet would be to attribute constitutional 
significance to the difference between making the information appear in printed form versus on a 
computer screen.”). 
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of some kind or with services that are necessarily location dependent. 
Courts analyzing the intended reach of a website do so because they 
want to adequately address the defendant’s knowledge and intent,182 but 
by focusing more attention on the website than on the wrongful conduct, 
they actually accomplish the opposite. If the defendant has control over a 
website’s reach and has attempted to limit that reach in some way, then 
those efforts are relevant in determining the defendant’s intent. But 
where the defendant is a website user, the website’s intended audience is 
much less relevant. If the website does not indicate an audience, then the 
court should look to other evidence to determine what the defendant 
actually knew or thought about where her comments might reach. 
Instead, by focusing on the website’s aim, courts impute the intent 
of the website’s owners to all of the website’s users without taking into 
account the users’ perceptions of the website’s audience or purpose. In 
Gorman, for example, at least one of the defendants knew where the 
plaintiff lived.183 When that defendant made defamatory comments about 
the plaintiff’s business, he surely must have anticipated that any resulting 
harm to the business would occur where the plaintiff lived. One wonders 
if the defendant even thought about the website’s audience at all before 
commenting. Like many Internet users, he might have assumed the 
comments could and would be read anywhere in the United States. 
Making information available throughout the country is a common 
purpose of websites, especially those, such as the one used in Gorman, 
that serve a nationwide organization. 
B. Nationwide Jurisdiction Can Be Avoided in Most Cases but 
Sometimes May Be Desirable 
The second principle courts should keep in mind in these cases is 
that the brunt-of-the-harm prong of the express aiming inquiry can limit 
the number of potential forums, even for plaintiffs with national 
reputations or businesses. The Marten plaintiff, for example, likely could 
not have satisfied this prong outside of either his home state or the state 
in which the school’s business operations were centered. The harm 
suffered in that case related to the plaintiff’s ability to attend classes at 
the defendant school, a harm that would not have been felt in the other 
states with which the school might have had online contact because the 
plaintiff had no connection to those states.  
Even in cases like Gorman or Dring, where the statements at issue 
concerned a national issue or reputation and therefore could have caused 
 
 182. See, e.g., IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 264 (3d Cir. 1998) (explaining that 
focusing solely on the geographical location of harm fails to give sufficient weight to the defendant’s 
knowledge and intent in causing that harm). 
 183. See Gorman v. Jacobs, 597 F. Supp. 2d 541, 551 (E.D. Pa. 2009). 
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harm to the plaintiffs in many states, nationwide jurisdiction need not be 
the inevitable result. After all, the Calder plaintiff was famous across the 
country due to her participation in the Partridge Family, but the 
Supreme Court found that California was the primary location of her 
injuries because the defamatory statements involved her ability to 
perform her professional obligations, most of which originated in and 
were carried out in California. Similar lines could be drawn in Gorman 
and Dring based on the state in which each plaintiff did the bulk of his 
business, created the relationships about which the statements at issue 
were concerned, or carried out the majority of his relevant obligations. 
On the other hand, nationwide jurisdiction may be acceptable in 
some cases—and is in keeping with the Keeton Court’s rationale. In that 
case, the plaintiff’s only contact with New Hampshire was the harm she 
suffered when the magazine’s defamatory issues were circulated there. 
Presumably, then, jurisdiction would have been proper in any and every 
state in which the magazine circulated. Therefore, perhaps courts should 
accept that jurisdiction in multiple (even many) forums is an acceptable 
result in some cases.  
Though Keeton and J. McIntyre may seem in conflict, a more careful 
reading reveals that they are complementary. Justice Kennedy’s 
comments about national versus state-specific targeting and about the 
limits of foreseeability should be read together. Where one targets a 
national market (or, as in some of the cases discussed in this Note, a 
plaintiff with a national reputation), mere foreseeability about where 
harm will be caused is not enough. This was true in Pavlovich, where the 
defendant could only guess that distributing his source code would cause 
harm in California. In such cases, as in J. McIntyre, limits on jurisdiction 
make sense. “Reasonable foreseeability” does not mean conjecture. On 
the other hand, in cases like Dring, defendants are certain (or should be) 
that their actions will cause harm in a particular place. Their knowledge 
and intent with regard to the plaintiff are the “something more” that 
Justice Breyer was looking for in J. McIntyre. Indeed, Justice Breyer’s 
pointed questions about online sellers like Amazon.com in his J. 
McIntyre concurrence184 hint at continuing acceptance of widespread 
jurisdiction over certain types of cases. And because the harm they cause 
is more than foreseeable—it is certain—it should not offend the 
principles underlying Justice Kennedy’s J. McIntyre opinion to exercise 
jurisdiction over these defendants in any number of forums. 
At least one court has concluded that express aiming may still be 
defined broadly post-J. McIntyre. In Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand 
Technologies, Inc., an Ohio-based corporation alleged that a Florida-
 
 184. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2793 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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based corporation had committed copyright infringement by posting the 
plaintiff’s copyrighted celebrity photographs on the defendant’s celebrity 
gossip website.185 The Ninth Circuit held that California courts could 
exercise specific jurisdiction over the defendant even though the state 
was neither party’s primary place of business.186 Though the website 
targeted a national market and not specifically California, the court 
found that the defendant had “continuously and deliberately exploited 
the California market.”187 The defendant “operated a very popular 
website with a specific focus on the California-centered celebrity and 
entertainment industries” and, as a result, “anticipated, desired, and 
achieved a substantial California viewer base,” which was “an integral 
component of [its] business model and its profitability.”188 Thus, the court 
concluded that “[a]s in Keeton, it does not violate due process to hold 
[the defendant] answerable in a California court for the contents of a 
website whose economic value turns, in significant measure, on its appeal 
to Californians.”189 The court noted that if the defendant had been an 
individual or an “unpaid blogger,” the result probably would have been 
different because such a person cannot be as certain that their website 
will be widely viewed.190 In other words, the national reach of the 
defendant’s website favored, rather than opposed, a finding of specific 
jurisdiction. This national reach was what ensured that the defendant’s 
action would cause harm in a distant state. Finally, the court 
acknowledged “the burden that our conclusion may impose on some 
popular commercial websites. But we note that the alternative . . . would 
substantially undermine the ‘interests . . . of the plaintiff in proceeding 
with the cause in the plaintiff’s forum of choice.’”191 
Regardless of the extent to which they draw from J. McIntyre, courts 
facing wrongful online conduct cases should focus on the defendant’s 
specific knowledge and intent with regard to the plaintiff. Only by 
focusing on the defendant’s subjective beliefs can the court adequately 
determine her knowledge and intent with regard to where she expressly 
aimed her actions. And only when courts focus on these factors can they 
define purposeful availment in the Internet context in a way that allows 
defendants to accurately predict when and where they will be subject to 
suit.  
 
 185. 647 F.3d 1218, 1221–23 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1101 (2012). The Ninth Circuit 
concluded that J. McIntyre was not directly applicable to the facts of Mavrix because the case involved 
tortious conduct. Id. at 1228. 
 186. Id. at 1221. 
 187. Id. at 1230. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 1231. 
 191. Id. (quoting Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978)). 
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Conclusion 
Just as the Internet facilitates the spread of information, so too does 
it enable users to direct hurtful statements and actions at others, even 
when the target’s physical location is unknown or unclear. Courts have 
struggled to redress the resulting harms without creating nationwide 
jurisdiction over every person who uses a website. This struggle has led 
to conflicting tests and results for determining where jurisdiction may 
properly be exercised, making it more difficult for Internet users to 
determine when and where they might be haled into court. Current 
approaches to defining specific jurisdiction for wrongful online conduct 
threaten to turn users’ perceptions that the Internet is a place without 
consequences into a reality. 
Reasonable foreseeability is a touchstone of personal jurisdiction. In 
deciding what is reasonably foreseeable, courts must look at more than 
just the facts of the case at hand. They must also recognize the effect of 
precedent on shaping reasonable foreseeability, especially in an area as 
confused as this one. Only by focusing on the defendant’s specific 
knowledge and intent can courts avoid creating jurisdiction for contacts 
that are random or fortuitous and ensure jurisdiction in cases where the 
defendant knowingly intended to cause specific and serious harm to the 
plaintiff. A website’s level of interactivity and intended audience are only 
two factors to consider and should have only minimal weight in most 
cases involving website users rather than owners. Furthermore, courts 
should not allow users to hide behind ignorance (willful or otherwise) of 
a plaintiff’s geographic location. Finally, courts should accept that some 
online conduct will lead to jurisdiction in multiple forums and, in 
accepting this outcome, consider the Supreme Court’s desire to find a 
forum for the victims of intentional, wrongful conduct. 
